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Key words: price dispersion, consumer search, market structure Empirical research has established that there is signi￿cant dispersion in prices
charged by retail outlets for seemingly homogeneous goods.1 Indeed, price dispersion
appears to be pervasive in that it is observed in markets with very di⁄erent structures.
The objective here is to investigate the way in which the underlying structure of the
market can a⁄ect equilibrium price distributions.
A relatively large literature attempts to explain how price distributions can arise
as part of a market equilibrium. In search models2, a large number of ￿rms post prices
and consumers pay a cost to observe the prices o⁄ered. Most contributions in this
literature generate non-degenerate equilibrium price distributions by assuming that
￿rms and/or consumers di⁄er in some way. (See, for example, Reinganum, 1976; Var-
ian, 1980; Carlson and McAfee, 1983; Rob, 1985; Stahl, 1989; Spulber 1989; Jansen
and Moraga 2004.) These models have led to new and important insights. Neverthe-
less, their particular nature makes them di¢ cult to generalize to other environments.
The Burdett and Judd (1983) model of noisy search di⁄ers somewhat. When both
consumers and ￿rms are homogeneous, the unique equilibrium is characterized by a
continuous distribution of price o⁄ers. This paper illustrates the ￿ exibility of Burdett-
Judd approach. We consider a market structure with one large ￿rm having multiple
outlets and a competitive fringe consisting of many small ￿rms each with a single
outlet. Single outlet ￿rms o⁄er a continuous distribution of prices, and the multiple
outlet ￿rm, the recognized market leader, o⁄ers the highest price in the market. Not
surprisingly, market power generates higher average prices, making consumers worse
o⁄. Prices at the multiple outlet ￿rm tend to be higher than prices charged if there
were only single outlet ￿rms. The high price from the market leader confers bene￿ts
1See, for example, Stigler, (1961); Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser, (1979); Carlson and Pescatrice,
(1980); Villas-Boas, (1995); Warner and Barsky, (1995); and Sorensen, (2000). This dispersion,
somewhat surprisingly, appears to persist despite the recent rise of e-commerce. Although consumers
with a connected computer can now observe a huge number of prices for any particular good at a
relatively small cost in time and energy, evidence to date demonstrates that price dispersions for
similar goods sold on the web are signi￿cant and stable. (See, for example, Brynjolfsson and Smith,
2000; Baye and Morgan, 2001; and Baye, Morgan and Scholten, 2001.)
2So called clearing house models o⁄er an alternative approach to price dispersion.
1on all outlets.
The market structure considered here has become part of the standard ￿ tool-kit￿
in industrial organization (Carlton and Perlo⁄, 1999, p. 63-65, 107-118). There are,
of course, a wide variety of additional settings and topics. The more general message
here is that the broad framework o⁄ers a ￿ exible and robust platform on which to
study many other classical problems in industrial organization.
The Framework
Suppose there is a ￿xed continuum of consumers and retail outlets. One large
￿rm has proportion ￿ of all outlets and many small ￿rms have a single outlet each.
All outlets sell a homogeneous, indivisible good. A consumer who purchases at price
p; enjoys utility z ￿p: Before the market opens, each ￿rm posts a price which cannot
be changed once set. The marginal cost of production is constant. Without loss of
generality, assume marginal cost is zero.
All large ￿rm outlets o⁄er the same price - x: Let F(p) denote the probability a
single outlet ￿rm o⁄ers a price no greater than p: Further, let p‘ and ph indicate the
in￿mum and supremum of the support of F with z ￿ ph ￿ p‘ ￿ 0 for any F.
As distributions with mass points will be considered, the following notation con-
vention is used. Given distribution function F; assume for any p
F(p) = lim
"!o;">0F(p ￿ ") + ￿(p)
where ￿(p) indicates the mass of ￿rms o⁄ering price p; if such a mass exists. If
￿(p) = 0 for all p; the distribution is said to be continuous.
Consumers search over prices to maximize expected utility from purchasing the
good net of search costs, c > 0. A consumer observes one o⁄er with probability
1 ￿ ￿ and two o⁄ers with probability ￿: An observed price is the realization of an
independent draw from all prices on o⁄er. There is no recall of previously rejected
o⁄ers. Neither ￿rms nor consumers discount the future.
This type of search has been termed noisy search and can be motivated as follows.
In an attempt to ￿nd a low price, the consumer pays a cost to observe a price, say
by visiting a store. After visiting this store and observing the price, with probability
2￿ this consumer meets a friend who has contacted another store and observed a
di⁄erent price. If this meeting occurs, the friends exchange information by informing
each other of the price o⁄ered and location of each store visited. The consumer
then either purchases from one of these two stores, or pays c and searches again. If
a friend is not contacted, the consumer either purchases from the store visited, or
search continues.
Single Outlet Firms
A given outlet cannot in￿ uence the number of buyers it contacts - consumers
search randomly. Hence, a ￿rm maximizes expected pro￿ts by maximizing expected
pro￿t per consumer visit. Suppose for the moment all ￿rms expect consumers to use
e⁄ective reservation price R > 0. Each single outlet ￿rm takes as given three objects
- the price o⁄ered by the multiple outlet ￿rm, x; the e⁄ective reservation price of
consumers, R; and the distribution of prices made by other single outlet ￿rms, F:
Given random search, the ￿rm￿ s expected pro￿t per potential customer when it o⁄ers





p[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(p) + ￿(p)=2) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿] for p < x
p[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(p) + ￿(p)=2) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿=2] for p = x
p[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(p) + ￿(p)=2)] for p > x
(1)
where ￿ denotes the probability the consumer contacted is one who has only observed
one price that period. Note that ￿(pjR;x;F) = 0; for p > R:
A market equilibrium is de￿ned later. Nevertheless, it will be useful to specify
an important element of it at this point. In an equilibrium we require that for given





= ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 for all p on support of F
< ￿ ￿ otherwise
(2)
It is possible to restrict the class of distributions functions that can be a SPD.
Claim 1: Given (R;x); 0 < x ￿ R; if F is a SPD, then F is continuous.
Proof: R > 0 implies that for any given F; when 0 < ￿ < 1; ￿rms can obtain strictly
positive expected pro￿ts per customer. Hence, no ￿rm charges p = 0:




0(1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ F(p
0)) + ￿(p
0)=2]
Clearly, if a ￿rm o⁄ers price p0 ￿ "; " > 0; then
￿(p
0 ￿ "jR;F) ￿ (p
0 ￿ ")￿ + (p
0 ￿ ")(1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ F(p
0)) + ￿(p
0)]
It follows from inspection that ￿(p0 ￿ "jR;F) > ￿(p0jR;F) for small enough " > 0
and therefore a contradiction completes the proof.￿





p[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(p)) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿] for p < x
p[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(p)) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿=2] for p = x
p[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(p))] for p > x
(3)
The object now is to demonstrate that for given (R;x); 0 < x ￿ R; there exists a
unique SPD. Claim 2 ￿rst establishes that at any SPD the supremum of the support
is either, ph = R; or ph = x: This result along with (3) can be used to establish the
expected pro￿ts at any SPD.
Claim 2: Given (R;x); 0 < x ￿ R; suppose F(:jx;R) is the associated SPD (pro-
vided one exists).
(a) If F(xjx;R) < 1 and x < R; i.e., if a positive measure of single outlet ￿rms
o⁄er a price greater than x; then ph = R and the expected pro￿ts of all single
outlet ￿rms is ￿R:
(b) If F(xjx;R) > 0; i.e., if a positive measure of single outlet ￿rms o⁄er a price
no greater than x; then F(xjx;R) ￿ F(x ￿ "jx;R) > 0 for all " > 0 small
enough. Further, the expected pro￿ts of all single outlet ￿rms is
x[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(xjx;R)) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]:
Proof: Given F(xjx;R) < 1; suppose ph < R: As F(:jx;R) must be continuous, the
expected pro￿ts of a ￿rm o⁄ering ph is ￿ph: However, a ￿rm o⁄ering price p such that
4ph < p ￿ R obtains expected pro￿ts ￿p > ￿ph: This leads to a contraction thereby
establishing (a).
Given F(xjx;R) > 0; suppose there exists a p1 < x such that F(p1) = F(x); i.e.,
no single outlet ￿rm o⁄ers a price p1 < p ￿ x: The expected pro￿ts of a ￿rm o⁄ering





p[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(xjx;R)) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿] for p1 < p < x
p[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(xjx;R)) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿=2] for p = x
It follows immediately that ￿(pjx;R;F(:jx;R)) is strictly increasing in p when p1 <
p < x. This implies there is a contradiction establishing the ￿rst part of (b). It also
follows that
￿(pjR;x;F(:jx;R)) ! x[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(xjx;R)) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]
as p ! x: Hence, because F(:jx;R) is a SPD all ￿rms must make these expected
pro￿ts. ￿
The next Claim establishes that given R (0 < R ￿ z); there exists two numbers,
x(R) and x(R), such that (a) if x < x(R) then at a SPD all single outlet ￿rms o⁄er
a price more than x and (b) if x > x(R); then at a SPD all single outlet ￿rms o⁄er
a price less than x: This Claim further fully characterizes the unique SPD for given
R and x in both case (a) and case (b).
Claim 3:
(a) Given R such that 0 < R ￿ z; de￿ne x(R) by
x(R) = ￿R (4)
If x < x(R); there is a unique SPD, F(:jx;R); such that F(xjx;R) = 0; i.e.,
all single outlet ￿rms o⁄er a price greater than x: Further,
F(pjx;R) = 1 ￿
￿(R ￿ p)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)p
(5)
with support [p‘;R] such that
p‘ =
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
R (6)
5(b) Given R such that 0 < R ￿ z; de￿ne x(R) by
x(R) =
￿R
￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
> x(R) (7)
If x > x(R); there is a unique SPD, F(:jx;R); that implies F(xjx;R) = 1;
i.e., all single outlet ￿rms o⁄er a price less than x: Further,
F(pjx;R) = 1 ￿
(x ￿ p)[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]
p(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
(8)
with support [p‘;x]; where
p‘ = x[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿] (9)
Proof: Given (x;R) such that 0 < x < R ￿ z; suppose all single outlet ￿rms o⁄er a
price greater than x: From Claim 2(a) it follows that all ￿rms make expected pro￿ts
￿R: Suppose a deviant single outlet ￿rm o⁄ers a price p < x: Such a ￿rm sells to all
consumers who visit and therefore obtains expected pro￿ts (per potential customer)
￿(pjx;R;F(:jx;R)) = p for p < x: Hence, the deviation is not pro￿table if x < x(R);
where x(R) is de￿ned in (4). Given x < x(R); equal expected pro￿ts for all single
outlet ￿rms yields
￿R = p[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(p))]
Solving implies that F(:jx;R) satis￿es (5) and (6).
Given (x;R) such that 0 < x < R ￿ z; suppose all single outlet ￿rms o⁄er a price
less than x: From Claim 2(b), it follows that if F is a SPD, then all single outlet
￿rms make expected pro￿ts x[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]: When will a ￿rm want to deviate and
o⁄er a price greater than x? Given x < R; a ￿rm that o⁄ers a price greater than x
will o⁄er price R and obtain expected pro￿ts ￿R: Hence, no single outlet ￿rm will
select to deviate and o⁄er a price greater than x if x > x(R); where x(R) is de￿ned
in (7). Given x > x(R); equal expected pro￿ts for all single outlet ￿rms yields
p[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(xjx;R) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿] = x[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]
for all p on the support of F(:jx;R). Solving implies F(:jx;R) satis￿es (8) and (9).￿
6The next step is to characterize the unique SPD for when the multiple outlet
￿rm charges intermediate prices, i.e., for x between x(R) and x(R). For such an
intermediate x; single outlet ￿rms not surprisingly distribute themselves on either
side of the multiple outlet price. However, this distribution contains a gap. There
exists a range of prices immediately above x which lead to lower than equilibrium
expected pro￿ts so that no single outlet ￿rm sets its price in this region.
Claim 4: For ￿xed R > 0 (0 < R ￿ z); if x 2 (x(R);x(R)); then there exists a
unique SPD; such that
￿(x;R) =
￿R ￿ x[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]
x(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
(10)
indicates the proportion of single outlet ￿rms o⁄ering a price greater than x: Further,






p(1￿￿)(1￿￿) for pl < p ￿ x
F(xjx;R) for x < p ￿ e p(x;R)
1 ￿
(R￿p)￿





￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿(x;R)
> x (12)
and
p‘ = ￿R (13)
Proof: Given R (0 < R < z); if x(R) < x < x(R)); then we require the expected
pro￿ts of single outlet ￿rms o⁄ering a price greater than x to be the same as that
obtained by those o⁄ering a price less than x; i.e.,
￿R = x[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿(x;R) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿] (14)
Solving implies ￿(x;R) must satisfy (10). For those single outlet ￿rms o⁄ering a price
greater than x; equal pro￿ts implies
￿R = p[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(pjx;R))]
7for all p > x on the support of F(:jx;R): As
￿(x;R) = 1 ￿ F(xjx;R) = 1 ￿ F(~ pjx;R)
this yields e p(x;R) in (12). Given ￿R in (14) it follows that e p(x;R) > x:
For those single outlet ￿rms o⁄ering a price less than x; equal pro￿ts implies
￿R = p[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(pjx;R)) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]
for all p < x on the support of F(:jx;R): Solving for F and then again for pl generates
the form of the unique SPD as presented in (11) and (13). Note, F(pjx;R) =
F(xjx;R) for all p 2 [x; e p(x;R)]:￿
The Multiple Outlet Firm
The multiple outlet ￿rm takes as given the reservation price of consumers, R; and
the response of single outlet ￿rms as represented by the family of SPDs fF(:jx;R)g0<x￿R:
Whatever price the multiple outlet ￿rm charges, x; the response by single outlet ￿rms
can be described by the unique SPD, F(:jx;R): This speci￿cation in e⁄ect makes
the multiple outlet ￿rm a market leader that sets its price before single outlet ￿rms.
At a particular outlet, the multiple outlet ￿rm￿ s expected pro￿ts per potential






x[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿=2] for x < x(R)
x[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿(x;R) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿=2] for x(R) ￿ x < x(R)
x[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿=2] for x(R) ￿ x ￿ R
(15)
where again ￿(x;R) equals the proportion of single outlet ￿rms o⁄ering a price greater





> > > > > <
> > > > > :
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿=2 for x < x(R)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿(x;R) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿=2
+x(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
@￿(x;R)
@x for x(R) < x < x(R)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿=2 for x(R) ￿ x ￿ R
(16)
Note, if x < x(R) or x > x(R); the above derivative is strictly positive. Further, if









8Clearly, @2￿m(x;R)=@x2 < 0: At both x = x(R) and x = x(R); @￿m(x;R)=@x is
strictly positive and therefore @￿m(x;R)=@x > 0 for all x(R) < x < x(R): It follows
from inspection that the multiple outlet ￿rm will maximize its pro￿ts by o⁄ering price
R:
If n consumers are searching for a low price, then [2￿+(1￿￿)]n = (1+￿)n is the
expected number of o⁄ers observed by consumers. It follows that ￿ = (1￿￿)=(1+￿)
denotes the probability a ￿rm contacts a consumer who only observes one price (given
a contact is made). Therefore, in equilibrium the multiple outlet ￿rms charge price
R; and the distribution of prices charged by the single outlet ￿rms is given by
F(pjR) = 1 ￿
(x ￿ p)[1 ￿ ￿ + 2￿￿]
2p￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(17)
where the support of F is [p‘;R]
p‘ =




Before discussing consumer behavior, we ￿rst de￿ne an equilibrium
De￿nition: A market equilibrium is (R￿;x￿;fF(:jx;R￿)g0<x￿R￿); where
(a) x￿ maximizes the multiple outlet ￿rm￿ s expected pro￿ts given R￿ and fF(:jx;R￿)g0<x￿R￿
(b) the SPD, F(:jx￿;R￿); describes the optimal pricing behavior of single outlet
￿rms, given x￿ and R￿
(c) R￿ is the reservation price of any consumer, given x￿ and F(:jx￿;R￿)
So far we have shown that, given R; equilibrium conditions (a) and (b) are sat-
is￿ed when the multiple outlet ￿rm o⁄ers price R; and the equilibrium response of
single outlet ￿rms is given by the SPD, F(:jR;R): Each consumer takes F and x as
given. Without loss of generality assume that (a) and (b) are satis￿ed and therefore
consumers take R and F(:jR;R) as given for some R; where 0 < R ￿ z:
As search is random,
9(a) (1￿￿)(1￿￿) denotes the probability the consumer receives only one o⁄er which
is from a single outlet ￿rm,
(b) 2￿(1￿￿)￿ denotes the probability the consumer receives one o⁄er from a single
outlet ￿rm and one from the multiple outlet ￿rm; and
(c) ￿(1￿￿)2 denotes the probability the consumer receives two independent o⁄ers
each from a single outlet ￿rm.
Given the multiple outlet ￿rm charges price R with probability one, with proba-
bility (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + 2￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿) the consumers lowest price observed is a random
draw from F(:jR;R); whereas ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 indicates the probability the lowest price
observed is a random draw from G = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ F)2: Hence, with probability
￿ = 1 ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + 2￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
2]
the lowest price observed is R: Suppose all ￿rms expect consumers to use e⁄ective
reservation price, R; the multiple outlet ￿rm charges price R; and F(:jR;R) is the
SPD: In this case the expected return to a consumer from search can be written as
V = ￿c + [(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + 2￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿Z Q
p‘






(z ￿ p)dG(pjR;R) + (1 ￿ G(QjR;R))V
￿
+ ￿maxfV;z ￿ Rg
where Q is the reservation price used that satis￿es z ￿ Q = V: Integrating by parts
and manipulating yields
V = ￿c + [(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + 2￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
Z Q
p‘





+(1 ￿ ￿)V + ￿maxfV;z ￿ Rg
As maxfV;z ￿ Rg = V + maxfQ ￿ R;0g; we have








G(pjR;R)dp + ￿maxfQ ￿ R;0g
10for any R (0 < R ￿ z): In equilibrium we require either Q = R, for some R ￿ z; or
Q > R; for all R ￿ z: De￿ne ￿(R) by









Substituting (8) for F(:jR;R) and performing the relevant integration establishes that






￿(1 ￿ ￿)2g (18)
This implies we have a unique equilibrium. Using ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 + ￿); the following
Proposition summarizes what has been established above.
Proposition: There exists a unique equilibrium in which (a) the multiple outlet ￿rm
o⁄ers price R￿; (b) R￿ satis￿es (18) and (c) the distribution of prices o⁄ered by single
outlet ￿rms can be written as
F(pjR
￿;R
￿) = 1 ￿
(R￿ ￿ p)[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ 2￿)]
2p￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(19)
with support [p‘;R] such that
p‘ =




Further, consumers utilize reservation price R￿:
Discussion
Prices are strategic complements. A higher price at any particular outlet increases
the expected payo⁄ at those outlets with lower prices thereby generating a positive
spillover among outlets. As potential competitors raise their prices, an outlet has an
increased incentive to raise its own price.
The multiple outlet ￿rm but not the single outlet ￿rms takes advantage of its size
in this situation. Realizing that with probability ￿ it will capture the spillover from
11a higher price at one of its outlets, the multiple outlet ￿rm has the incentive to push
up the highest price found in the market (relative to the supremum price in the case
where there are only single outlet ￿rms and when R < z). The extent to which this
occurs depends on the number of outlets operated by the multiple outlet ￿rm. For
z > c=￿(1 ￿ ￿)2, a larger proportion of outlets in one ￿rm generates a higher price x
at those outlets associated with that ￿rm.
In the competitive fringe of single outlet ￿rms, prices also increase with the propor-
tion of outlets in one ￿rm. The distribution of prices given ￿ stochastically dominates
the distribution of prices given ￿
0 if and only if ￿ < ￿
0, i.e. F￿(pjR￿;R￿) < 0. The re-
lationship between the price distribution and ￿ decomposes into two complementary
e⁄ects. Having more ￿rms charging the highest price reduces competition in the com-
petitive fringe and hence induces higher prices among these ￿rms. In addition, if the
supremum price increases as well, i.e. z < c=￿(1 ￿ ￿)2; fringe prices rise accordingly.
More interestingly, the range of prices is non-monotonic in ￿. In particular, if
z > c=￿(1￿￿)2; i.e. if there exists a su¢ ciently small ￿; price dispersion (as measured
either by the price range between the supremum and the in￿mum or by di⁄erences
in percentile price as discussed above) increases with ￿ until R = z: In this case, as ￿
increases, the rise of the supremum outstrips the rise in the in￿mum. However, once
￿ is su¢ ciently large so that the reservation price is limited by the monopoly price,
that is, R = z; a higher ￿ reduces dispersion. In this case, only the in￿mum increases
with ￿:
In equilibrium, because the multiple outlet ￿rm but not single outlet ￿rms is
privately providing a public good (for all outlets) of higher prices, single outlet ￿rms
earn higher expected pro￿ts than outlets associated with the market leader. Further
note that for z < c=￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 outlets, pro￿t per potential customer at the outlets
of the market leader are independent of ￿: Increasing the number of outlets at the
multiple ￿rm outlet only bene￿ts the remaining single outlet ￿rms.
In this noisy search model, although having one large seller and many small sellers
does not alter the fundamental source of price dispersion, it does in￿ uence pricing
in interesting ways. More generally, this model illustrates that noisy search can be
12adapted to address in a consistent manner issues fundamental to industrial economics.
For example, the approach appears well suited for including advertising, the adoption
of new technologies, and market entry and exit. The approach could likewise be
expanded to other areas such as international trade, as in Alessandria (2004).
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